In this paper we ask whether or not recent explosive growth in commodity derivative trading, both over the counter and on organized exchanges, represents a new use of these derivatives as an asset class to exploit a previously unrecognized hedge for business cycle risk as claimed by Gorton and Rowenhorst (2006) using data from 1959 through 2004.. We use a Lucas tree model to show that the negative correlation reported by Gorton and Rowenhorst between commodity future returns and real output growth is likely an equilibrium condition and should not be evidence of an unexploited hedging opportunity.
Introduction
In this paper we ask whether or not recent growth in commodity futures index trading represents a new use of commodity futures as an asset class to exploit a previously unrecognized hedge for business cycle and in ‡ation risk. Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) build a data set to measure the return and risk characteristics of an investment in a weighted portfolio of long positions in commodity futures. They found that the returns on this portfolio had the mean/variance characteristics of an equity portfolio. However, they also reported that if this investment was rolled over for a longer period the return was negatively correlated with the returns from comparable bond and equity portfolios.
The commodity future index funds began to be sold in 1995. These contracts are an investment in a long position of a weighted portfolio of commodity futures. In 2002, there were fewer than $20 billion in these index contracts. By the middle of 2008 the commodity futures index funds had grown to more than $250 billion. These long-only positions were sold to pension funds (including the Federal Government Employee and the California Public Employee Retirement System), University Endowment funds, and other institutional investers as an asset class that was meant to hedge business cycle (equity) risk and in ‡ation (bond) risk.
These index funds typically purchase the 2-month-ahead contract and roll it over one month before it matures. The rollover is a signi…cant market event that has become known as the "Goldman roll." The idea that the commodity futures index created an instrument that could be widely used to hedge bond and equity risk may explain why commodity prices rose so much at the same time that these funds grew so rapidly. The Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) data set ends in 2003. Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) conclude that an index fund in commodity futures would o¤er an asset class that could be used to hedge existing systematic risk coming from business cycle and in ‡ation uncertainty. In this short note, we show that in a frictionless complete market setting, such a negative correlation can arise in a no-arbitrage equilibrium. In this setting the investment in commodity futures does not o¤er a hedge against business cycle risk. In this note we do not address the issue of whether commodity futures are an e¤ect hedge against in ‡ation risk.
A Lucas Tree Model
There are two countries, home and foreign. Home produces apples, y a and foreign produces oil, y b . There is no storage technology. There are two consumable, apples and car-riding c a and c b respectively. The latter is produced with oil using a …xed coe¢ cient production function. To simplify assume that 1 unit of oil produces 1 unit of car-riding. This is equivalent to assuming that agents receive direct utility from consumption of oil. The budget constraint facing the home country is:
The home household maximizes
Foreign country's problem is symmetric. It holds claims to home country's apples and takes short position in issuing oil futures. About trading commodity futures, it is important to note that no money changes hands at date t. In equilibrium, n j t add up to zero across home and foreign because if the home takes a long position, the foreign must take a short position. Hereafter we will specialize to the home country's problem.
First order conditions
Stock:
Futures:
Spot :
Spot price is given by the intratemporal marginal rate of substitution between c b and c a :
The stock price equation (1) 
E¢ cient Risk Sharing
The problem stated here resembles Lucas (1982) two-country world. Since both countries have identical preferences, same in size and additive separate utility function, international asset markets will be used to pool risks. We price the assets assuming as in Lucas that perfect risk pooling occurs althiugh the results do not depend on this assumption. This means that home country will hold half of its apple claims and half of oil claims. In equilibrium, c a t = :5y 
Spot and Futures Prices
With a log utility it easy to verify that the futures price is given by:
To see (4) start with the spot price at the terminal date t + k which is s t+k = y at+k =y bt+k . This means that the penultimate forward price F One can rewrite (4) and obtain the following neat relationship between forward and spot prices.
Noting that s t = y at =y bt ; the following expression for the forward premium (sometimes this is called a forward spread) holds
Note that the expectation operator on the right hand side is a convex function of the future growth rate of oil. The immediate implication is that a greater uncertainty of future oil production raises the forward premium on oil futures.
Correlation between returns on stocks and futures
The equilibrium stock price is proportional to apples production as follows:
where * represents foreign and is the utlity weight assigned to the home country. . The immediate implication is that c a t = y a t , c a t = (1 )y a t and c b t = y b t , c b t = (1 )y b t : Perfect risk pooling means = :5: With log utlity function, the pricing kernel does not depend on :
Note that the return on stock is: fq t+1 + y a t+1 g=q a t : The immediate implication is that the expost stock return (call R t+1 ) is given by:
which means
In other words, the expost stock return is proportion to the growth rate of apples.
The expost return on futures (call it R F t+1 ) is:
The expost one period future return depends on the growth rate of apples ( the …rst square bracket term) and the news about future production of oil (the second square bracket term). Everything else equal, a better news about future oil production will depress the future returns because higher production of future oils signals lower future spot prices.
The correlation between stock return and oil futures returns is not obvious.
It depends on the correlation between apple production and news about future oils production. If apple growers use oil as an intermediate input, a better news about oil may lead to a higher supply of apples growth and this may make the stock return and future return covary negatively. To see this clearly assume that oil production follows a geometric random *walk:
where ln" t+1~N ( ; 2 ): One can rewrite (7) as: 
If cov(ln ); futures and stock returns will be negative correlated. This will happen in a no arbitrage equilibrium.
Some intuition:
If apples and oil grow together, higher growth of apples today gives news about the growth of oil. Thus an investor who was holding a lot of futures will see their values declining when apples grow today. However, the stock return on apples rises in response to higher apple production (more future dividends).
This explains why these two returns are negatively correlated.
Think it this way. Suppose a commodity investor wants to predict about future returns. If this model is true, he will run a regression of log oil on log apples. The regression coe¢ cient is cov(ln y Note that this regression coe¢ cient is nothing but the beta of oil given that apple is the market portfolio and captures all aggregate risk. If the systematic risk of oil is quite substantial (beta exceeding unity), market will show a negative correlation between stock and forward return.
Viewed in all these ways, the basic fact stands out. The negative correlation between stock return and future return can arise as a no-arbitrage equilibrium phenomenon.
Calibration
At a basic level, this simple model predicts that the second moments of the GDP growth rates and oil provide enough information about the correlation that one expects for the stock return and futures returns. We next verify whether this claim is empirically plausible. In particular we will see whether the negative correlations reported by Gorton and Rowenhorst (2006) re ‡ect an unexploited hedging opportunity or whether they re ‡ect the general equilibrium relations implied by our model. Table 1 portfolio. However, they also report that if this investment was rolled over for a longer period of 3 to 6 month, the return was negatively correlated with the returns from comparable bond and equity portfolios. We do not have their data set. Since our focus in this paper is on the correlation between stock return and the futures returns, we use S&P returns using the Shiller's dataset and futures return using S&P GSCI commodity futures index. 2 The data came from Haver 2 Shiller's dataset comes from his book "Irrational Exuberance." He constructs and S&P return by employing the formula dividend yield plus capital gain. This return measure comes closest to the model. Since the model involves real rate of return, we construct such a real rate by de ‡ating the Shiller's rate of return by the CPI rate of in ‡ation. The commodity futures return is constructed by computing the ratio of commodity futures indexes in two successive quarters. It is then de ‡ated by the CPI rate of in ‡ation to arrive at a real rate. Since Shiller's dataset ends in 2007Q4, we choose the sampel period 1973Q1-2007Q4.
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Table 2 reports the model correlations between stock returns and futures returns based on (5) and (7) and actual correlations. 4 Conclusion
